Louis XVI, the Court of the Tuileries, and the Corps Diplomatique 1789–91 by Caiani, Ambrogio Antonio
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Caiani, Ambrogio Antonio  (2016) Louis XVI, the Court of the Tuileries, and the Corps Diplomatique
1789–91.   International History Review, 38  (3).   pp. 421-439.  ISSN 0707-5332.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2015.1056820






Louis XVI, The Court of the Tuileries and the Corps Diplomatique 1789-1791*  
 
The cannon balls of Louis XIV’s Ultima Ratio Reges1 contrast sharply with Vattel’s 
cri de coeur that ‘A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign 
state than the most powerful kingdom.’2 These images bear testament to the 
incommensurable gap which divided early modern diplomatic theory from practice. The 
French Revolution sought to erect an edifice which would bridge this chasm. Alas, the 
deputies of the Constituent Assembly, despite their noble intentions, depressingly hurtled into 
a familiar vortex, where appeals to natural law hid naked military aggression and strategic 
egocentrism. Whether this outcome was inevitable or contingent on circumstances continues 
to pose a dilemma for historical writing on the early Revolution.3 Unsympathetic 
interpretations point an accusatory finger at the Assembly’s unilateral annexation of the Papal 
Comtat Venaissan and the usurpation of the sovereign rights of the German princes in 
Alsace.4 On the other side of the historiographical divide, optimists paint, in portentous 
terms, the Constituent’s ‘eternal renunciation of war as an instrument of conquest.’5 Any 
simple interpretation, which views 1789 as a dawn or dusk, runs the risk of deeply 
underestimating the complexities of the competing processes unleashed by the slow collapse 
of the Bourbon Monarchy.  
This article will seek to gauge the question of the French Revolution’s impact on 
diplomatic practice from a different perspective, namely that of the ambassadors and foreign 
ministers resident in Paris. The unpublished despatches of these diplomats and Parisian police 
reports help to shed new light on the French Revolution's gradual alienation from the 
international relations system of the ancien régime. This process was not simply a question of 
a downward spiral, but one in which both foreign diplomats and the politicians in the 
National Assembly came to realise they were, quite literally, speaking different languages. It 
is true that, ultimately, a new vision of international relations did emerge, but this was not a 
linear process. Unstable dualisms characterised the years 1789-1791 rather than any 
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farsighted vision of statesmanship. From a more medium term perspective, Linda and Marsha 
Frey have argued recently that: ‘the assault on diplomats was part of the larger assault on 
diplomacy and the Old Regime, for intrinsic to the French revolutionary vision of 
establishing a new revolutionary order at home and abroad was the jettisoning of the old 
order and everything associated with it.’6 This article endorses such an assessment, but from a 
different perspective. Unlike the Frey sisters’ work, it is not a prosopographical and 
behavioural analysis of the careers of the emissaries despatched abroad to represent the 
revolution in the 1790s. It explores the opposite end of the spectrum, by examining the 
contrasting reactions of various members of the diplomatic corps in Paris to the unfolding 
revolutionary drama. Some embraced 1789 with enthusiasm, others immediately perceived it 
as a threat. Very few had as extreme a reaction as the Bailli de Guiran La Brillane, the 
minister plenipotentiary for the order of Malta, who died of apoplexy on hearing the news 
that the properties of his chivalric order would not be exempted from becoming biens 
nationaux.7 Diplomats, in general, reacted to the Revolution according to the dynastic 
interests and balance of power politics which characterised the ancien régime.8 The new 
language of the National Assembly was entirely alien to their world. Indeed, it would take 
these aristocratic ambassadors almost two years, and in some cases longer, to comprehend 
fully the reverberations of 1789 on the international arena.   
Diplomacy, in the eighteenth century, was intimately linked to a sovereign prince’s 
physical body and presence.9 Ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary and chargés d’affaires 
did not represent states, let alone nations, but were the physical proxies of their sovereign 
lords. They were accredited to the court of the Rex Christianissimus. They mediated and kept 
open the channels of communication between princes who constantly competed over the 
fiscal-military resources of the European mainland and for colonies overseas.10 Choiseul had, 
pessimistically, lamented in 1760 that France had ceased to be a great power.11 
Understandable from a military perspective, especially in the depressing context of the Seven 
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Years War, in term of cultural influence and soft power this observation was decidedly an 
exaggeration.12 After all, Marc Fumaroli, in a persuasive anthology, has described the 
eighteenth century as the moment ‘when Europe spoke French.’13 There is much to sustain 
this interpretative thrust. One need only think of the example of the baron von Grimm who, 
during his long stint as the minister plenipotentiary for the duke of Saxe-Gotha in Paris, also 
unofficially acted as a proselyte for French culture. From 1753-1793 his influential 
periodical, the Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique provided a hungry 
European public with a digest of the latest publications, plays, operas, cultural and 
fashionable innovations which were gripping the Parisian public.14 Famously, he included 
among his subscribers Catherine II, Frederick II, Gustave III and Stanislas II Augustus. The 
cultural and intellectual influence which Paris exerted over the elites and courts of Europe 
seems, despite recent revisionism, hard to dismiss offhand.15 In spite of the military reversals 
of the century, French savoir-vivre and intellectual controversies continued to captivate the 
attention of foreign admirers. It was the apogée of European Francophilia.16  
A palpable repercussion of this international prestige was that Paris remained the most 
important diplomatic centre and listening post in Europe. The Almanach Royal of 1789 lists 
thirty-one resident ambassadors and Ministers Plenipotentiaries accredited to the Court of 
France.17 A very impressive figure when one considers that most continental princes at the 
time barely maintained half a dozen permanent representatives abroad at any one time. Paris 
was in some ways a European school for diplomacy. Especially when one compares it to 
major diplomatic centres like London, Vienna, Rome and Madrid which did not receive as 
many regular diplomatic agents from the sovereign lords of the Holy Roman Empire.18 Yet, 
behind this backdrop of officialdom lurked a less than limpid world, inhabited by 
innumerable extraordinary representatives, unofficial agents, spies and culture brokers, who 
employed less licit means to further their masters’ dynastic interests.19  
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Ambassadors and minor diplomats formed a close-knit community within Paris.20 
They hosted lavish dinners, balls and other divertissements from their rented and 
sumptuously furnished hôtels particuliers. Foreign ministers shared a strong collaborative 
spirit. So much so that, during the 1780s, they even established a gentleman’s club, on the 
English model, exclusively reserved for members of the corps diplomatique which was, 
somewhat unimaginatively, designated le club des ambassadors. From the police reports of 
the contrôle des Etrangers, and Antoine Liliti’s work on Salons, it is possible to reconstruct 
their daily lives in great detail.21 Indeed in May 1790 one police inspector went so far as to 
note the quasi-incestuous nature of ambassadorial society in Paris:  
 
Lord Fitzgerald has a decided taste for pretty and worldly women. He has been for 
sometime an assiduous visitor of the Portuguese ambassador’s wife. One even 
suspects that Her Excellency today prefers him to the Baron Goltz, the Prussian 
envoy, who was her preferred lover for a long time. The ambassador is always in bed 
by ten, in this way, Madame ambassador can pass the evening with whomsoever she 
pleases.22 
 
Diplomats were extremely well integrated into the Parisian beau monde. They frequented the 
best Salons, like those of the marquise de la Vaupalière or that of the duchesse de la 
Vallière.23 Here they grabbed hold of any useful snippets of information and gossip (political 
or otherwise) which they could include in their weekly despatches. Resident ministers were 
also assiduous in their attendance at all the cultural activities this great European city had to 
offer. The opera, comédie Française and théâtre des Italiens were filled with diplomats who 
eagerly took note of changes in taste, mood and fashion.24 Effectively, foreign representatives 
became indistinguishable from the French nobility. Indeed, in some cases, marriage alliances 
solidified their ties to the Second Estate. For instance, the Genoese Minister, the marchese di 
Spinola, had married one of the daughters of the influential duc de Lévis, and the marques de 
Souza, ambassador of his most Faithful Majesty, had wedded the rich heiress Mlle de 
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Canillac.25 These men had the same taste, social outlook and lifestyle as their French hosts, 
the only significant difference was the fabulous wealth which the ambassadors of the great 
powers could deploy at whim. The corps diplomatique exerted an important social, economic 
and cultural influence on Paris, however it would be wrong to circumscribe their role to urban 
sociability.  
 It was an ambassador’s close contact with the king of France, and his court, that 
defined his role and raison d’être. Indeed, their very lifestyle proves that, rather than 
constituting a dichotomy, la cour et la ville existed in symbiosis.26 The diplomatic calendar 
was set, regulated and characterised by the ceremonial rhythms and étiquette of Versailles. 
Audiences d’arrivé, de congé, compliments to the princes of the blood, entertainments and 
official suppers with the ministre des affaires étrangères were among the most important 
duties which occupied ambassadorial schedules.27 On average, diplomats were expected to 
attend court once a week, generally Tuesday, and more often during seasonal royal festivities. 
Since the end of the sixteenth century, as its international standing grew, the court of France 
had developed a sophisticated bureaucratic, logistical and ceremonial apparatus, which 
attempted to integrate foreign grandees into the court’s elaborate internal hierarchy.28  
The introducteurs des ambassadeurs and the archivists of the foreign ministry 
developed protocols and symbolic routines, which sought to integrate and establish the status 
of diplomats at court.29 A strict precedence, anchored in tradition, military power, family ties 
and religion, continued to define the international pecking order among the nations of 
Europe.30 Reciprocity was at the heart of the system. A delicate balance had to be maintained 
between the claims to pre-eminence of the Rex Christissimus and the competing pretentions 
of his brother monarchs. Only through mutual compromise could a favourable equilibrium be 
maintained. This is why, in 1803, Gerard Rayneval, premier commis in the foreign ministry 
since Vergennes’ time, still believed that an ambassador’s chief role was ‘de se rendre 
agréable, d’inspirer de la confiance, de se faire considérer.’31 Affability was of the utmost 
importance and was a springboard for diplomatic success. Such an ethos meant that the corps 
diplomatique of the 1780s was contradistinguished by its ancien régime ethos. Noble honour, 
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a courtly mindset, respect for hierarchy and monarchical sovereign authority were essential 
features of the diplomatic Weltanschauung. Only by playing by these rules could 
ambassadors protect privileges, exemptions and immunities, which were still granted at 
monarchical whim rather than guaranteed under international law.32 
From the earliest days of the Revolution, the presence of the corps diplomatique 
would give rise to problems. After all, these foreign magnates were to be exempted from the 
gradual destruction of privilege, feudalism and titles of nobility. They quickly came to be 
perceived, with some reason, as a counter-revolutionary fifth column. In his Nouveaux Paris, 
Louis Sébastien Mercier described them in far from flattering terms: 
 
Emissaries: able scoundrels that are vomited into our midst by foreign courts and who 
remain always in their pay. They hover over us, in order to find out our secrets and 
excite our passions. If you are weak, they praise your prudence; if you are prudent, 
they accuse you of weakness. They call your courage temerity; your justice cruelty. 
Welcome them and they conspire publicly; threaten them and they will conspire in the 
shadows. Only yesterday they assassinated our patriots, today they attend their 
funerals and bestow divine honours on their victims. They simply await the moment 
when they can stab us all in the back.33 
 
Mercier’s caricature captures well the attitude of the press and revolutionary public toward 
diplomats in the capital. The argument ran that a regenerated Nation, which had abandoned 
military aggrandisement, had no need to employ a small army of spies and intriguers. One of 
the direct consequences of the upheavals of the October days was that Paris, after roughly a 
century, once again became a court city and an administrative centre.34 The immediate 
problems, which faced government in these early days, were largely logistical. Without the 
facilities afforded by the enormous palace complex of Versailles, the ministerial bureaucracy 
of the crown had to find accommodation within the city’s precincts. This déménagement 
would take the better part of 1790 to be completed. The ministère des affaires étrangères 
weathered the move well by renting three hôtels particuliers: two in the rue de Bourbon and 
another in rue de l’Université.35 However, the bulk of its archives, records and library 
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remained in Versailles.36 One could speculate that the comte de Montmorin doubted the move 
would be permanent. Equally, diplomatic rhythms received something of a shake-up in 1790. 
Foreign ministers, no longer facing the, not insignificant, costs of travelling to Versailles, 
started to attend court on a twice weekly basis (more if one considers the jeux de la reine on 
Thursdays).37 The arrival of the court and foreign ministry in Paris doubled the contact 
between Louis XVI and the representatives of his brother monarchs. Whether this was a 
natural consequence of greater proximity or part of a larger counter-revolutionary conspiracy 
is difficult to unravel. What is certain is that these emissaries came to be viewed by the 
Parisian populace as members of the detested cour de Tuileries. The fortunes of the corps 
diplomatique were inextricably intertwined with that of the Bourbon Monarchy.   
For at the heart of the matter lay a fundamental and competing understanding of the 
nature of sovereignty. The abbé Sieyès stated in his celebrated pamphlet ‘What is the Third 
Estate?’ that the Nation was the supreme font of political legitimacy.  
 
What is a Nation? A body of associates living under a common law and represented 
by the same legislature.38  
 
Sieyès’ (and the revolutionaries’) Nation was fundamentally different from later nineteenth 
century formulations.39 Most importantly, Monarchy received no mention or accommodation 
in this definition. The consequences of this omission were to be momentous. The regenerated 
Nation was a collective fiction (or community to use Benedict Anderson’s formulation). It 
was on behalf of the ‘imaginary’ body of all French citizens that, in 1789, the Third Estate 
had arrogated the prerogatives of sovereign power by declaring itself to be a National 
Assembly.40  The Nation in 1789, on the whole, was a relatively neutral term. Supposed 
national characteristics, mores, customs and traditions only started to seep into this concept 
during the maelstrom of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.41 The Nation, as a concept, 
in the early 1790s was supposed to justify and legitimise the Assembly’s ambitious program 
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to reform the administrative apparatus of the state.42 This agenda necessitated that the old 
edifice be dismantled.  
Those intermediate bodies, which had been so characteristic of the composite nature 
of the Bourbon monarchy, faced extinction.43 Given this grim prospect, it is hardly surprising 
that the Parlement of Rennes protested against its dissolution and argued that it represented a 
Breton Nation. The lawyer-infested Constituent Assembly was all too familiar with how the 
judicial remonstrances and jurisdictional quibbles of the ancien régime had blunted the 
Bourbon monarchy’s administrative efficiency. They were determined not to go down the 
same road. The comte de Mirabeau, during what became known as the bataille des Bretons, 
quickly countered all appeals to regional particularism by reminding his colleagues that in a 
‘real Nation’ an imperium in imperio could not exist.44 Indeed the so-called Breton nation 
was nothing of the sort! It was the feudal residue left behind by Anne de Bretagne’s marriage 
contract to Charles VIII. In an age of reason, where the laws of nature took precedence over 
obscure barbaric traditions, it could claim no legal validity. The Breton Parlement and Estates 
were the emanation of a privileged society of orders and thus inimical to the very reality of 
Nationhood. The nobility of Brittany was forced to recognise that the regenerated France had 
shredded the old rule book. This new political mindset was sufficiently problematic when 
applied to domestic affairs, and it caused great disarray when transported to the international 
domain. 
Most of the deputies of the Constituent Assembly had a solid grounding in both 
classical and contemporary jurisprudence.45 They were familiar with the concept of ius 
gentium, or law of nations, which regulated (or, more accurately, purported to do so) early 
international relations. Unlike the haphazard and ad hoc nature of existing agreements, 
precedents and regulations, the revolutionaries had a distinctly more classical vision of this 
body of law. The Roman ius gentium had, in antiquity, granted concessions and truces to 
unconquered barbarians outside of the imperial borders.46 The civilised Roman world, 
however, did not negotiate with lesser peoples on an equal footing.47 It did not feel honour 
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bound to respect its temporary agreements, and would break them when the dictates of 
expediency and ‘liberty’ demanded it. Reciprocity, balance of power and precedent were 
practices that had little hope of survival, given the principles adopted by those elected to the 
revolutionary assemblies of the 1790s. Like the Roman statesmen on whom they modelled 
their behaviour, these reforming politicians believed that France, regenerated by its purifying 
Revolution, could not be bound to honour agreements with feudal and unenlightened 
monarchies.48 It was up to the world to imitate or match France’s progress, not for the 
Revolution to make compromises. After all, the language of universalism and 
cosmopolitanism, which so distinguished 1789, did hide some distrust and intolerance of 
cultural and political difference.49  
In the immediate aftermath of the storming of the Bastille, diplomats were perplexed 
and unsure, whether the disorders they had witnessed would have wider consequences 
outside of the hexagon. Reactions varied, to a degree, but unbridled enthusiasm was 
decidedly an exception. As Thomas Jefferson wrapped up his Parisian mission, he actively 
praised France’s ‘juridical Revolution’ and hosted some dinners for the leaders of the 
National Assembly.50 He effectively participated in revolutionary politics by inspiring and 
helping Lafayette write a preliminary draft of the declaration of the Rights of Man.51 The 
‘sage of Monticello’ was sympathetic to the radical minority of the assembly. The papers of 
the Contrôle des Etrangers reveal that a contingent of eminent foreigners (especially British) 
came to view the French Revolution at work. Indeed, in 1790 the Salle du Manège, where the 
Constituent Assembly held its sessions, became a stopping point on many Grand Tours. For 
instance, the young Russian count Stroganoff attended the debates of the assembly with his 
tutor, the future Conventional Romme, as part of his legislative education.52 Others, like Lord 
Mountstewart, were so assiduous in their attendance of all political gatherings, including the 
Jacobin club, that the police of Paris suspected that he was a British spy on a secret mission.53 
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The marques de Souza, the Portuguese ambassador, was the member of the diplomatic corps 
who appeared most frequently in the Assembly’s visitors’ gallery. It is difficult to gauge the 
impact this had on the advice he returned to the Braganzian court but, as the police noted with 
some jocularity, the ambassadress was grateful for his frequent absences which allowed her 
to pursue her own ‘affairs.’54  
However, for the vast majority of foreign ministers, the Bourbon’s monarchy’s loss of 
authority was an unsettling event. They were to experience mistreatment, the violation of 
their immunities and some danger from the very outset. The best known case is that of the 
comte de Mercy-Argenteau, the ambassador of the Holy Roman Emperor. He left Paris 
almost immediately after the fall of the Bastille and headed for the relative safety of his 
country residence.55 His British colleague, the duke of Dorset, noted: ‘the situation of count 
Mercy, the Imperial ambassador, must be very disagreeable; a constant guard is kept around 
his Hotel and everything that goes out or in examined most narrowly lest he should hold a 
correspondence with the Queen.’56 For the remainder of his Embassy he rarely returned to the 
capital and, when he did, he tended to arrive nocturnally.57 These secret meetings did not 
endear him to the radical sections of the city which, not without reason, suspected that he was 
encouraging the Queen’s counter-revolutionary stance and designs.58 Within days, the duke 
of Dorset was equally at the receiving end of the unwelcome attention of the Paris 
Municipality. There were rumours circulating that he was paying unspecified agitators to 
stoke a counter-revolution. The Commune decided to intercept his despatches and, much to 
their chagrin, discovered that his correspondence was in effect innocuous.59 Nevertheless, 
Dorset was publicly perceived as compromised, and the violation of his freedom of 
communication made his recall inevitable. The British legation remained in the hands of the 
chargé d’affaires, Lord Robert Stephen Fitzgerald, for the better part of a year.60  
While some of this mistreatment can be put down to traditional French Austro- and 
Anglophobia, the case of the Venetian ambassador is decidedly more difficult to explain. On 
22 August 1789, the chevalier Capello, Minister Plenipotentiary for the Republic of St Mark, 
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received a note ordering him, as a member of the Parisian National Guard, to sentry duty in 
his district of Saint-Martin-des-Champs.61 The reason why a foreigner residing in Paris 
should have been included in the lists of citizens liable for National Guard duty is entirely 
mysterious.62 All that is known with certainty is that the chevalier had no intention of being 
forced into an embarrassing corner. He ignored the summons and headed to Versailles to 
attend the celebrations for the feast day of Saint-Louis. Here he, discreetly, protested his 
inclusion among the National Guard and received the support of his ambassadorial confrères. 
In this particular instance the court calendar saved the chevalier Capello from the tricky task 
of explaining the concept of diplomatic immunity to the activists of his district. The political 
culture of the Revolution, as the Frey sisters argue, was highly unsympathetic to old style 
diplomacy.63   
The Assembly only gradually encroached on the royal monopoly over foreign policy 
which was the métier du roi par excellence.64 The deputies’ interest in international relations 
was piqued by specific circumstances. On 10 December, a minor diplomatic incident 
highlighted the fragility of Louis XVI’s hold on power. The revolt of the Austrian 
Netherlands had reached a turning point.65 The rebels of Brabant decided to send Vandernoot 
as an emissary to seek French assistance and gain recognition of their declaration of 
independence.66 The king, as Joseph II’s ally and brother-in-law, had refused to either receive 
this plenipotentiary or recognise his credentials. Vandernoot, going against standard 
diplomatic practice, contacted the National Assembly directly. While nothing was decided 
immediately, this Belgian affair did highlight that the legislative branch was latently rivalling 
the monarchical executive when it came to external relations with other European powers. 
Vandernoot, not a man to take a hint, resumed his quest to receive accreditation in 1790. By 
March his case reappeared on the debating floor of the Assembly.67 In the end, the marquis de 
Lafayette defused the situation with the novel claim that the Belgian congress: ‘did not seem 
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to possess those bona fides which emanate from the sovereign power of the people.’68 The 
Belgians were denied real nationhood. The king’s determination not to receive Vandernoot 
was respected, but the Assembly had, to a certain extent, arrogated, quietly, the right to 
supervise the monarch’s conduct of foreign relations. Equally perplexing was that the 
Austrian treaty of Alliance was disregarded in the deputies’ deliberations.69  
The ambassadors did not silently tolerate such disregard for the laws of nations. 
Archbishop Dugnani, the papal nuncio, and doyen of the corps diplomatique, presented 
Montmorin with a collective note of protest in November 1789.70 The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs forwarded these concerns, regarding the safety of diplomats in Paris, to the President 
of the National Assembly. After a brief debate, on 12 December the deputies decided that the 
well-being of ambassadors fell under the remit of the executive power and decreed that 
nobody should breach their privileges, exemptions and immunities.71 The flashpoints and 
rhythms of the Revolutionary maelstrom were to affect considerably the ability of these 
diplomats to fulfil their functions. During the feast of the federation in 1790, the carriage of 
the countess of Fernán Núñez, the Spanish ambassadress, was attacked.72 The crowd was 
incensed that anybody should still have the audacity to bear coats of arms and employ livered 
servants. These emblems of feudal obscurantism had been banned under the terms of the 
decree which abolished titles of nobility on 19 June.73 Alas the people of Paris had forgotten 
(or perhaps did not care) that corps diplomatique had been specifically exempted from the 
provisions of this law. A year later the crisis over the civil constitution of the clergy 
witnessed the burning in effigy of the Pope and his Nuncio in public. Archbishop Dugnani, 
wisely, decided to take the waters in Aix en Savoie as a means of effecting a discreet 
departure.74 His attempt to have his silverware shipped to Milan in May 1791 sparked a 
minor riot. Crowds surrounded the Apostolic Nuncio’s coachman who was trying to transfer 
these valuables to his Italian bankers for shipping. It required all the powers of persuasion of 
the police commissioner of the Beaubourg district to persuade the populace that this was not 
a covert attempt to fund counter-revolution, but a legitimate transfer of property. After a 
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standoff of several hours, the unfortunate coachman was allowed to return to the 
Nunciature.75 Foreigners were always easy suspects, but ambassadors, as the agents of 
foreign princes, seemed natural enemies of the Revolution.  
It would be tempting to list more incidents and miscommunications between the corps 
diplomatique and France’s new legislative authorities.76 Yet, this would present a skewed 
tableau of the realities which confronted foreign diplomats in Paris. Essentially, the internal 
disorder and turmoil facing the new constitutional monarchy not only left a domestic power 
vacuum, but also seemed to generate an international one, whose ultimate consequences were 
difficult to predict. Indeed, the European powers welcomed the military and naval mutinies 
which engulfed France’s armed forces in 1790.77 For the emissaries of foreign powers the 
revolution of 1789 was only one of many variables which influenced the diplomatic 
checkerboard. TCW Blanning eloquently reminds us that during this time the ‘Eastern 
question’ (which would remain insoluble for the better part of a century) captivated the 
attention of the Europe’s ministerial cabinets much more than the fall of the Bastille which, in 
many ways, represented a side show in comparison.78 The early French Revolution embodied 
as much an opportunity to the corps diplomatique as it did a breakdown in the international 
order. Indeed diplomats from Austria, Prussia, Russia and Poland increased their activities in 
Paris in the hope of profiting from French weakness.  
The contraction of the Ottoman Balkans, due to military collapse, heralded the 
prospect of an unstoppable Russian south-western advance.79 Neighbouring powers, such as 
the Habsburg and Prussian monarchies, witnessed the far from welcome arrival of this Slavic 
monolith on their eastern borders.80 They began to seek the means of ensuring their strategic 
security. A significant territorial realignment became necessary in order to avoid a massive 
military conflagration on a continental scale.81 The empires of the east turned their attention 
to that traditional buffer state: the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. Indeed Albert Sorel 
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observed, in his opus magnus, that the twin dethronements of Louis XVI and Stanislas II 
Auguste: 
 
were not unforeseen coincidences that emerged from opposing conspiracies. These 
were parallel designs, which led to [momentous] consequences, that were conceived 
and developed simultaneously. There is a link between these [two events], so to 
speak, that forms a common thread in this history, and the influence that the one 
exerted on the other determined events in Europe during the French Revolution. 82 
 
A detailed analysis of the circumstances which led to the second partition of Poland in 
1793 is unnecessary here. There are many excellent diplomatic studies which deal with this 
epic tragi-comedy in depth.83 However, this wider international context deeply influenced the 
behaviour and calculations of the corps diplomatique in Paris. In some ways it explains the 
diplomatic wait and see mentality that characterised the year 1790. Ambassadors and other 
foreign diplomats had to wear two hats at the same time. They not only sought to understand 
the internal dynamics of the Revolution, but also speculated whether this unexpected 
circumstance could be useful to their princes’ foreign policy objectives. For example, on 21 
June 1790, the marquis de Cordon, the Piedmontese Minister in Paris, in a ciphered despatch, 
provided his monarch with a detailed report of the latest intelligence from the banks of the 
Vistula.84 Similarly, his Genoese counterpart stated, in August, that ‘we have just received 
notification that the court of Berlin has concluded with Poland a treaty of alliance and 
commerce. This news has produced the greatest sensation here and it is predicted, with some 
reason, that war in Germany is now inevitable.’85 The threat of war seemed firmly anchored 
in the east in 1790. Only gradually did the corps diplomatique (indeed Edmund Burke was 
the only overt interventionist at this time) come to perceive revolutionary France as a threat 
to the international order.86  
                                                          
82   Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution, II, 458.  
83  For detailed studies see, Robert Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, A Study in Diplomatic History 
(Cambridge, MA, 1915); & Jerzy Lukowski, The Partitions of Poland, 1772, 1793 & 1795 (1999), chs. 5 & 6  
84  A[rchivio di] S[tato]T[orino], Francia Lettere Ministri Mazzo 236, Francia 1790 lettere orig Marchese de 
Cordon al Re ed al Ministro, 21 juin 1790 dépêche no.91. 
85  A[rchivio di] S[tato] G[enova], Archivio Segreto Lettere Ministri Francia 2262, 5 agosto 1790; & later in 
1791 the minister plenipotentiary for Parma celebrated the peaceful revolution which had taken place in Poland 
and which was grounded in true reason (the contrast with France seems imlicit), in A[rchivio di] S[tato] 
P[arma], Carteggio Borbonico Estero Francia 82, 22 maggio 1791.  
86  Jennifer Welsh, Edmund Burke and International Relations: The Commonwealth of Europe and the Crusade 
against the French Revolution (Basingstoke, 1995). 
15 
 
Historically, Poland had been a vital chess piece in France’s European grand strategy 
(both official and secret) and foreign prestige (both official and secret).87 Yet, defeat in the 
Seven Years War, and the Primate of Gniezno’s insult to the marquis de Paulmy, France’s 
ambassador in Warsaw during the election diet of 1764, had altered the situation.88 The 
ministerial cabinets of Versailles had had to face the reality that they no longer possessed 
sufficient prestige to influence affairs east of the Elbe.89 It was one of those remarkable 
historic co-incidences that the fiscal implosion of the Bourbon Monarchy coincided, almost 
exactly, with the Polish Commonwealth’s last-ditch attempt to reform its moribund state 
apparatus. The French Revolution completely reversed both the French monarchy’s and corps 
diplomatiques’ perception of the Eastern Question. After nearly thirty years of interruption, 
Franco-Polish relations were to resume underneath the shadow of the Bastille. Poland sent the 
cosmopolitan Tuscan, Filippo Mazzei, to act as an unofficial agent and, from 1790, as chargé 
d’affaires.90 As an active participant in the American War of independence, this Italo-
American was initially an enthusiastic supporter of the events he witnessed.91 He assured his 
Polish sovereign on 7 August 1789 that ‘France will avail herself of her pre-eminence in 
order to maintain peace as much as it is possible throughout the entire world.’92 The tone was 
that of an enlightened activist rather than that of a professional diplomat. A more seasoned 
emissary would have been more sober in expectations and conduct. His mission was 
exceedingly delicate, and came on the back of the dismal failure of a similar enterprise 
entrusted to the American adventurer the Chevalier Littlepage in 1788.93 In essence, it 
seems94 that Mazzei was to seek out some sort of French alliance or, failing that, to influence 
French public opinion positively in favour of the reforms being introduced by the four year 
Sejm. Without the political fallout of 1789, the Polish monarchy would have never attempted 
such a radical gambit. Despite the diplomatic character of his position, Mazzei actively 
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involved himself in French domestic affairs. In 1789 he collaborated with Condorcet in 
publishing a new translation of the English Bill of Rights.95 Later, he not only joined the 
influential think tank the société de 89, but was on its steering committee as corresponding 
secretary.96 He even tried to have Stanislas II August elected to its membership.97 This was 
an honour which his Polish Master declined, as he suspected that it would not please Louis 
XVI.98  
The exchange of three hundred and sixty letters between this agent and his royal 
master bear testament to the last king of Poland’s hopes that Revolutionary Paris could 
provide some assistance to his own royal-republic’s precarious position. Disillusionment was 
not slow in setting-in and already, by November 1789, Stanislas II described eloquently how 
comparisons between the political upheavals occurring in the opposite extremities of Europe 
only bore superficial resemblances:  
 
If I could get you to know Poland as well as you know France, you would be 
surprised at the many analogies shown by the course of events in the two countries, 
with essential and capital differences, however. One is that there was no royal 
despotism to destroy here, but that there is foreign encroachment to destroy, an 
encroachment being fought and to be fought for still many years on all sides. The 
other is that in all that takes place here only that part of the nation known as the 
nobles is involved.99 
 
France and Poland were players in the same international tournament, but their respective 
processes of internal regeneration diverged significantly in both cultural and practical terms. 
For the better part of the year, Mazzei was taken-in by the vacuous promises of support for 
the Sejm’s reforms given by Lafayette and his circle.100 This Tuscan philosophe was a witty 
and knowledgeable correspondent, who passionately depicted France’s political transitions, 
but as a diplomat he was a mediocrity, who did not possess the phlegm required to play the 
game. In September 1790 he received the title of chargé d’affaires. Yet, by this time, it was a 
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mere sinecure, which was meant to prepare the way for the arrival, in April 1791,of Poland’s 
first resident minister to France in twenty-six years, Count Oraczewski.101 Indeed, by 
December 1790, Stanislas was beginning to question his representative’s revolutionary zeal 
and reminded him of the dangers of partisanship.  
 
I do not believe I need tell you that as an employee of a foreign court and nation, you 
must avoid all that might make you look like a partisan, not to mention the possibility 
of your becoming openly embroiled with someone or other. I certainly do not expect 
you to break off relations with Messrs de la Rochefoucauld, de Liancourt, de 
Lafayette, Condorcet, Bailly and others of that stamp [….] but you are surely too 
sensible to take a dislike to persons, otherwise estimable, who believe that the whole 
French Revolution is nothing but destruction without re-edification and hence that it is 
only a misfortune.102 
 
From this point onwards, Mazzei’s initial zeal decidedly cooled down. He had hoped that 
friendship with Revolutionary France could strengthen Poland’s bargaining position. 
However, the powerlessness of Louis XVI and the treatment of the Catholic church sobered 
his expectations.103 As time progressed, it became clear that his moderate Fayettiste friends 
could only deliver more good intentions when it came to the ‘Eastern Question.’ The 
secondary objective of Mazzei’s mission was yet another lost cause. He had been instructed 
by his Polish master to try to save the properties of the order of Malta from confiscation.104 
He received respectful thanks for his interest from Montmorin but everything short of any 
formal undertaking to protect the possessions of the knights of Saint John.105  
These failures did not deter the Ministère Etrangère from renewing its historical 
diplomatic interesting in Eastern Europe. Louis XVI and his ministers actively tried to keep 
their Polish options open.106 In February 1792, the recently appointed French ambassador to 
Warsaw, the comte Descorches de St Croix, drafted several articles for a treaty of amity. 
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Article seven of this document stated that : ‘French or Polish subjects who reside in either 
country will be treated like their own citizens, as foreigners who are most welcome.’107 Given 
the political instability this treaty never came into effect. It laid the groundwork for France 
becoming the preferred destination of Polish exiles for the better part of the nineteenth 
century. The Poles were under the impression that their cause and that of the Revolution were 
the same. For two decades they would fight with distinction in both the armies of the republic 
and the empire.108  
In the end, the Polish mission to Paris achieved little, though it proved a decided 
distraction for the ministers of Austria, Prussia and Russia. The French Revolution was not 
perceived immediately as a danger in the realm of international relations, on the contrary, it 
seemed to offer a number of possibilities for the reconfiguration of the Eastern side of the 
European continent. Indeed Sorel went so far as to accuse the Prussian envoy, baron Goltz, of 
having led a political as well as a press campaign against Marie Antoinette to distract French 
attention from Eastern Europe.109 He even suggested that, the future mayor of Paris and 
Girondin, Pétion de Villeneuve may have been secretly employed by Prussia as an agent 
provocateur.110 The appearance, in Paris in 1791, of the somewhat shady Jewish-Prussian 
financier Ephraim was probably connected to the Polish question.111 This agent of Frederick 
William II’s was despatched to France, it seems, to negotiate some sort of treaty or 
arrangement that would ensure neutrality when it came to Polish matters.112 Ephraim seems 
to have exerted a certain prurient fascination for the police of Paris, who kept him and his 
danseuse mistress under tight surveillance. He met discreetly with the baron Golz, almost 
daily, and seems to have had a budget of over half a million livres at his disposal.113 He 
opened something akin to a press office where, with the help of two secretaries, he sent 
regular missives to Berlin. Unfortunately, the commissaires de police were never able to 
penetrate his mission’s ultimate objectives. Shortly after the flight to Varennes, as a 
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preventative measure, he was arrested.114 His activities had alarmed the Parisian public, who 
suspected him of being a counter-revolutionary financier trying to flood the French market 
with counterfeit assignats. In the end, Ephraim failed to keep a sufficiently low profile and 
was forced to leave France precipitously.  
The first years of the 1790s created an uncertain atmosphere, where most foreign 
agents continued to act according to the traditional norms of ancien régime diplomacy. They 
remained committed to their prince’s dynastic interests. They showed little appetite for a 
concerted international effort against the Revolution. The only exception, perhaps, was the 
kingdom of Sardinia, where the comte d’Artois had sought refuge. Early disturbances from 
revolutionary agitators in Savoy greatly concerned the court of Turin. As early as May 1790 
the marquis de Cordon, the Piedmontese Minister, wrote the following ciphered note to 
Victor Amadeus III:  
 
After all, it is public knowledge that the chief authors of the Revolution do all in their 
power, through sinister manoeuvrings, to pervert the peoples of adjoining states and  I 
have learnt that they have managed unfortunately even to give rise to troubles in our 
own homeland. I hope that one will take promptly vigorous measures to smother such 
disturbances immediately.115  
 
Very unwisely, the marquis actively involved himself in counter-revolutionary projects. The 
comité des recherches of the Commune de Paris found some of his letters among the papers 
seized in the affaire Maillebois.116 This was a conspiracy, which aimed to restore Louis XVI 
to full power through armed force. Cordon, therefore, had to leave discreetly Paris shortly 
after the feast of the federation.117 Though this was a serious incident, it still fell into the 
mould of the old diplomacy. The marquis was acting in the interests of his prince rather than 
with a view to stabilising a European state system.  
Much more perplexing was the rhetoric emanating from the Assembly’s debates on 
the right of declaring war and making peace during the Nootka Sound crisis. Britain and 
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Spain came to blows over a shipping incident on the Pacific coast of North America.118 Under 
the terms of the Family Compact, Spain asked France to support its territorial claims. Louis 
XVI requested that the assembly provide him with the financial means of arming fourteen 
ships of the line. This triggered, in mid May 1790, an intense debate in the Assembly on who 
ultimately held the reins of foreign policy; crown or Legislative Assembly. The baron de 
Menou opened the debate on 15 May by declaring:  
 
It is therefore essential to legislate on [who holds] the right of declaring war or 
making peace; afterwards we shall decide which of the two nations is in the right. If 
Spain is [in the wrong] we must use all our influence to mediate [in this dispute] and 
encourage her to yield; if England is wrong and she refuses to accept justice we 
should not just arm fourteen vessels but [mobilize] all our land and seas forces. Only 
at this point will we show Europe that this is not a ministerial war, but a national 
one.119 
 
Certainly the prospect of arrogating the Monarchy’s power, to determine foreign policy, 
made the deputies feel a sense of excitement for this radical new political departure. On the 
18th day of the same month, the Alsatian Reubell denied that reciprocal obligations could 
exist among states:  
 
Treaties of alliance represent nothing but the ability to raise taxes and ruin the state’s 
treasury; to bestow this right on the king is to give him the constitutional right to sell 
men like flocks of sheep. The executive power should decide the quantity and where 
to deploy our forces: a great nation should have no other ally except providence, its 
own power and justice.120 
 
The debate was a stormy one for the Constituent Assembly.121 Although divergent views 
were expressed throughout the May crisis, ultimately, the deputies’ vindication of natural law 
removed the few constraints that had traditionally structured ancien régime foreign 
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relations.122 Treaties that emanated from the cabinets of princes, it was argued, had little or no 
validity. Only nations, with representative national assemblies, could legitimately enter into 
negotiations. The subversive potential of these assumptions was not immediately clear. Most 
of the corps diplomatique believed that these positions were mere postures and that, at heart, 
France could not really wish to disrupt Europe’s balance of power while her army was in 
disarray. During the subsequent year, France unilaterally rejected its foreign commitments by 
annexing papal territory and repudiating the provisions of the treaty of Westphalia. Such a 
denial of international obligations started to convince these diplomats that they were no 
longer dealing with the Bourbon monarchy, but with a state that had increasingly gone rogue. 
Henry Kissinger has argued, compellingly, that Revolutionary states have prophetic visions 
when it comes to international affairs.123 No one better epitomised this tendency that 
Maximilien de Robespierre: ‘it is from France that freedom and happiness of the world 
should begin.’124 The road between pacifism and belligerence was paradoxically exceedingly 
narrow.  
 Despite such warning signals, most members of the corps diplomatique found it 
difficult to take the National Assembly seriously. Monsieur Porte, the Piedmontese chargé 
d’affaires, described with seething irony, in May 1791, how: 
 
The assembly took four days to discuss if one could annex Avignon, five further days 
to decide if coloured people could be active citizens and currently amuses itself, these 
past three or four days, with determining the organisation of future legislatures. 
Despite all this, it is now almost two years since the land tax has failed to be 
established, consequently it is not being paid and there are about thirty other bills that 
remain mere drafts […] This is akin to watching a man going to a shop to buy 
furniture while his house is burning down.’125  
 
While this quip hardly converted into a manifesto for armed intervention, it did show that 
diplomats seriously underestimated the revolutionaries’ seriousness in redefining the 
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foundation of international legitimacy. The regenerated French Nation was following a new 
trajectory and little compromise with the ancien régime past was possible. 
 The period after June 1791 was to be one of the most trying months for the corps 
diplomatique. The ambassadors had attended court like clockwork on 19 June. The 
surveillance reports of the contrôle des étrangers reveal that on: ‘21,22,23,24 [June] the 
ambassadors and ministers have not been seen anywhere during these days.’126 There is little 
doubt that the flight to Varennes was a truly international venture.127 The work of generations 
of historians, and most recently Munro Price, reveals that it was an Austro, Russo, Swedish 
and Spanish endeavour. Alan Blondy seems to have debunked the legend that the order of 
Malta provided over a million livres for this failed flight.128 This being said, the Bailli de 
Virieu minister for the knights of St John and Parma was decidedly unfavourable to the 
Revolution. Regardless of whether or not Malta participated in the enterprise, it was punished 
by the Assembly with the abolition of the orders of Chivalry in the subsequent month.129 On 
25 June the corps diplomatique assembled as a body on the terrace of the ambassador of 
Venice’s residence at the porte Saint Martin. Here, while they dined, they watched the 
sombre procession escorting a captive king back to his palace-prison.130 This spectacle was 
something akin to a funeral wake. In many ways, this grim cortège heralded not just the end 
of constitutional monarchy, but also indicated that Paris’ days as a hub for aristocratic 
diplomacy were entering their twilight. Fernán Núñez had already, on 23 June, written to 
Montmorin demanding that the residences of diplomats be guarded to ensure the safety of 
their residents.131 Very soon the ambassador would have to deny paranoid rumours that Spain 
had invaded and taken the city of Pau. The Revolutionary public, with some justification, 
interpreted Varennes as a prelude for an armed coalition of European princes against 
France.132 Radical opinion was mistaken in substance. This badly botched flight was the last 
resort of old school diplomacy. It was naively hoped that taking the king out of the capital, 
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and placing him in a position of strength, would permit the conditions for a renegotiation of 
the constitutional settlement.133 In the end this catastrophic blunder on the part of the ancien 
régime monarchy allowed the Assembly to form the impression that the hexagon was held in 
the tentacular grip of a massive European counter-revolutionary conspiracy.   
 By the time the Legislative Assembly started its deliberations in October, the corps 
diplomatique had been decimated by flight. France’s closest allies had recalled their 
representatives. Rome, Turin, Vienna, Madrid and Naples no longer believed that a 
negotiated settlement with France was possible.134 Jefferson’s successor as American 
Minister, Gouverneur Morris, assumed the mantle of Mirabeau, and was advising the court on 
how best to act in the present precarious circumstances.135 As is well known, the new 
deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly in this climate of international distrust upped the 
stakes in their rejection of the old European international system.136 The most important 
legacy of the last years of the corps diplomatique in Paris was one of misjudgement and 
miscommunication. Put simply, the noble emissaries of European princes did not take the 
assembly seriously, and constantly believed that it would collapse under the weight of the 
anarchy they perceived it was fomenting. The despatches of these ministers were full of 
disdain for the reform program of 1789 and depicted France as a Nation on the brink of 
military collapse. As Tim Blanning justly points out, for war to occur you need two players 
who think they can win. Austria and Prussia, with the encouragement of their brother princes, 
began to think, despite their notable military commitments in the East, that they could reap an 
early victory on the Rhine.137 The Revolutionary decade was characterised by unholy 
alliances. The Austro-Prussian one of 1791 was but the first of many such pacts (perhaps 
more shocking was the Russo-Turkish entente of 1799).  
 Most of the corps diplomatique in France had been instructed to maintain the peace in 
Western Europe. Their reaction to revolution was generally one of bewilderment. In a 
minority of cases, it was seen as an exploitable opportunity. Until Varennes, every attempt 
was made to resume normal working relations with the court of the Tuileries. In the end, 
ambassadors were accredited to a physical body: Louis XVI. As the Revolution eroded his 
                                                          
133  Price, The Fall of the French Monarchy, ch.8 ; & Timothy Tackett, When the King Took Flight (Cambridge, 
MA, 2004), passim.  
134  Anon, Almanach Royal (Paris, 1792), pp.184-186. 
135  Anne Cary Morris, The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, 2 vols. (New York, 1888), I,363-67. 
136  Blanning, Origins of the Revolutionary Wars, pp.99-113. 
137  Ibid, pp.23-27 & 113-119. ; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.182; & Thomas Naff, 
‘Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-1807,’ Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, vol. 83, No. 3 (1963). 
24 
 
residual monarchical powers, the emissaries of Europe’s princes were negotiating with an 
individual monarch who was unable to give any binding assurance or commitment. The 
decline of the corps diplomatique followed the same downward trajectory as the Revolution’s 
failed experiment with constitutional monarchy. The Bourbon crown, under pressure from 
foreign warfare, collapsed on 10 August 1792. By this time, the relationship between 
revolutionary deputies and old school diplomats had already hardened into what can only be 
described as a dialogue of the deaf.  
